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Abstract
Most of the assets on the balance sheet of typical banks are illiquid. This exposes
banks to liquidity risk, which is one of the key risks for banks. Since the value of
assets is determined by their risks, liquidity risk should be included in valuation.
This paper develops a valuation framework for liquidity risk. An important ele-
ment of the framework is the definition and derivation of an optimal admissible
liquidation strategy that describes the assets a bank will liquidate in case of a
liquidity stress event (LSE). The main result is that the discount rate includes a
liquidity spread that is composed of three elements: 1. the probability of an LSE,
2. the severity of an LSE, and 3. the liquidation value of the asset.
The framework is illustrated by application to a stylized bank balance sheet.
1
1 Introduction
One of the main risks of a bank is liquidity risk. This is reflected by, for instance,
the inclusion of liquidity risk measures in the Basel 3 framework [1]. The BIS paper
“Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” [2], aimed
at strengthening liquidity risk management in banks, stresses the importance of
liquidity risk as follows: “Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in
assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable
losses. The fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of short-
term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity
risk, both of an institution-specific nature and those affecting markets as a whole.”
The research in this paper is motivated by a number of questions (relevant
references are given and discussed in the next section):
1. Since liquidity risk is such an important risk for banks and the price of assets
is determined by their risks, should liquidity risk affect the valuation of the
assets of a bank?
2. It is well know from research in recent years that investors do expect a
discount in the price for illiquid assets. But how do individual investors
determine at what discount they are willing to buy or sell?
3. How are liquidity discounts of different assets related?
To address these questions this paper considers the impact of a bank’s liquidity
risk on the value of its assets. The purpose of this paper is to value this risk con-
sistently across all assets on a bank’s balance sheet, such as securities, mortgages,
loans, and derivatives.
The approach focuses on the discounting of cashflows generated by the different
assets. It is recognized that the discounting of cashflows of assets is determined
by their liquidity through the possibility that the bank has to liquidate (a fraction
of) the asset in the event of liquidity stress. As a consequence the discount rate
includes a liquidity spread. The main result of this paper is that the liquidity
spread is composed of the probability of a liquidity stress event (an event in which
the bank is force to sell some of its assets), the severity of the liquidity stress event,
and the liquidation value of the asset.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Firstly the relation of the research
presented in this paper and existing literature is discussed. Section 3 develops
a liquidity risk valuation framework and discusses some consequences. Section 4
extends the model to include credit risk and optionality. In section 5 a paradox is
discussed and the value of the assets on a stylized bank balance sheet is calculated.
Lastly the conclusions are summarized.
2
2 Related literature
2.1 Relation to Liquidity Pricing
Another line of research that is related to this paper is the extension of CAPM
with liquidity risk. Two relevant papers are [3, 4], but a much larger literature
exists. An important result of this line of research is that investors do require an
extra return for illiquidity of an asset. In other words, the price of an asset receives
a discount when the asset is illiquid. A question that is not addressed in this line of
research is: how should an individual investor determine the discount he requires
for illiquidity of an asset. This paper addresses this question for a specific type of
investors, namely banks.
2.2 Relation to Liquidity Risk Management
Liquidity Risk Management at banks receives an increased attention since the
credit crisis. An important aspect of liquidity risk management is that the risk
is correctly priced. Indeed one of the principles of the BIS-paper [2] is about the
pricing of liquidity risk.
Banks typically include liquidity risk in pricing by including the costs of their
liquidity buffer, see e.g. [5] for a description of this method. The reasoning is
that the liquid, high-quality assets in the liquidity buffer provide a lower return
than the less liquid assets that a bank otherwise could invest in. This difference
in return is interpreted as a cost of holding the liquidity buffer. This cost is then
charged to (illiquid) assets through Funds Transfer Pricing.
Although the above approach provides a pragmatic way to price liquidity risk,
there are two reasons why this cannot be considered a fundamental approach.
1. The value of the liquid assets in the liquidity buffer is given by their mark-
to-market (MtM). Since these assets are by definition liquidly traded their
MtM can be observed. Although from an interest rate income perspective
the assets give a lower return which may be interpreted as a cost, this is
questionable from a valuation perspective since these assets are valued at
their MtM and do not represent a loss.
2. The lower return given by the liquid assets is a consequence of their liquidity
(if this is indeed the distinction between assets in and outside the liquidity
buffer). The use of this lower return to determine a cost and charge this to
illiquid assets therefore is a circular reasoning1.
1Besides being circular the reasoning is, strictly speaking, not consistent. E.g. a bank
with a liquidity buffer of 20% of its assets which estimates a 400bp lower return on the
assets in the liquidity buffer, would charge 400bp× 20%/80% = 100bp for illiquid assets.
Clearly the 100bp charge is inconsistent with the assumed 400bp lower return.
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This paper provides a more fundamental approach to pricing liquidity risk. It
relates the probability of a liquidity stress event, the severity of the event, and the
liquidation value of the asset to the liquidity spread of that asset.
2.3 Relation to research on liquidation values
This paper is further related to research on liquidation values of assets. In partic-
ular the relation between transaction size and liquidation values has been studied
[6, 7]. This liquidation value of an asset is input in the liquidity risk valuation
framework developed here.
An interesting suggestion made by some authors is that risk management
should be based on liquidation values instead of the mark-to-market or fair value
of assets. The problem with mark-to-market valuation according to Caccioli et
al [8], is that it a large position when it is liquidated does not result in a cash
amount equal to the mark-to-market value, since the position is sold at a discount.
Therefore Caccioli et al argue that it is better to use impact-adjusted accounting,
where the valuation of a position is based on its liquidation value.
This paper has a different approach, since it focuses on including liquidity risk
in the fair valuation of assets. Nevertheless the result of this approach is that
the fair value of an asset includes the liquidation value of that asset, such that
the fair value of the asset is lower when the discount from liquidation is larger.
Therefore the liquidity risk valuation framework proposed here may address some
of the concerns of Caccioli et al.
3 Liquidity Risk Valuation Framework
Liquidity risk has various meanings and interpretations. This paper focuses on as-
pects of liquidity risk that affect the discounting of cashflows from illiquid assets.
Therefore the following definition of liquidity risk is used in this paper:
Definition: Liquidity risk is the risk for an event to occur, that would force a
bank to liquidate some of its assets.
Such an event can therefore be termed a liquidity stress event (LSE).
3.1 Liquidity Risk Model
In this paper LSEs are modelled as random events. The model consists of three
components:
• The probability that an LSE occurs: PL(t1, t2) will denote the probability
of such an event between t1 and t2.
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• The severity of an LSE. The severity will be indicated by the fraction of the
assets that a bank needs to liquidate FL. By definition 0 ≤ FL ≤ 1. For
simplicity FL will be assumed to be a fixed (non-random) number.
• The dependence structure of LSEs and other events. The model assumes
that LSEs are assumed to be independent from each other and from other
events such as credit risk or market risk events. The independence of LSEs
implies that the probability of N LSEs in the time interval t1 to t2 is given
by PL(t1, t2)
N .
It is convenient to introduce an intensity p(t) ≥ 0
PL(t1, t2) =
∫ t2
t1
p(t)dt, (3.1)
where in the following the assumption is made that p(t) = p is time-independent.
3.2 Valuation with liquidity risk
In an LSE a bank will liquidate some of its assets. These assets will be sold at a
discount depending on the liquidity of the asset. This discount in case of an LSE
may be recognized by defining an effective pay-off.
Effective pay-off =
{
contractual pay-off if no LSE occurs
stressed value if LSE occurs
(3.2)
The contractual pay-off includes all cashflows of the asset, for example optionality,
cashflows in case of default, cashflows if triggers are hit etc.
The stressed value includes the discount for liquidating part of the position in
the LSE. In case of a single LSE at time τ the stressed value may be expressed as
stressed value = fV (τ)LV + (1− f)V (τ), (3.3)
where V (τ) is the value of the asset at time τ , f is the fraction of the asset that
the bank will liquidate, and LV is the liquidation value as a fraction of the value
of the asset. It is assumed here that assets are divisible and any part of the assets
can be liquidated.
The fraction f of the asset that the bank will liquidate will be determined by
a liquidation strategy. In the next section the liquidation strategy that should be
used in valuation is derived.
Definition: The value of an asset under liquidity risk is defined as the present
value of the effective pay-off
V = PV [Effective pay-off] (3.4)
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Consider a cashflow of an illiquid asset at some future time T . In absence of
default risk the value at time t of the cashflow is related to the value at time t+dt
through
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)(1− pdt) + e−rdt[fV (t+ dt)LV + (1− f)V (t+ dt)]pdt (3.5)
The first term on the r.h.s. is the contribution from the scenario that no LSE occurs
between t and t+dt, the second term is based on (3.3) and is the contribution from
the scenario that an LSE occurs. The contribution from multiple LSEs between t
and t+dt may be neglected as long as p is finite, since this contribution is of order
(pdt)2 and dt is infinitesimal small.
Equation (3.5) may be rewritten as
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)[1− p(1− LV )fdt] . (3.6)
By introducing a liquidity spread
l = p(1− LV )f , (3.7)
this becomes
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)(1− ldt). (3.8)
The value of a cashflow at a future time T of notional 1 in absence of default
risk is derived by iterating (3.8)
V = e−(r+l)T , (3.9)
since limdt↓0(1− ldt)T/dt = e−lT .
The liquidity spread (3.7) used in discounting depends on the fraction of the
asset f that a bank liquidates, this fraction will be determined in the next section.
3.3 Liquidation strategy
Consider a balance sheet with a set of assets Ai with i = 1, 2, ..., N , where Ai de-
notes the market value and each asset has a unique liquidation value LVi. Without
loss of generality an ordering of the assets can be assumed: LVi > LVj if i < j.
Definition: A liquidation strategy for a set of assets Ai is a set of fractions si
of assets to sell such that
N∑
i=1
siAi = FL
N∑
i=1
Ai. (3.10)
with 0 ≤ si ≤ 1 and the sum over i covers all assets on the balance sheet.
Such a strategy could be, for instance, to sell the most liquid assets until suf-
ficient assets have been liquidated to reach FL
∑
iAi. Note that the strategy is
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allowed to depend on the order of the assets, but not on the liquidation values
LVi. The motivation is that a bank’s liquidation strategy will be, more likely, of
the type to liquidate assets based on their relative liquidity (e.g. most liquid assets
first) instead of on their exact liquidation values.
Definition: An admissible liquidation strategy is a strategy s∗i such that the
liquidity spreads implied by the strategy
li = p(1− LVi)s∗i , (3.11)
satisfy the condition that for any set LVi
LVi < LVj ⇒ li > lj . (3.12)
Definition: An optimal admissable liquidation strategy is an admissable liqui-
dation strategy with the lowest loss in an LSE. This loss is defined as
loss =
∑
i
siAi(1− LVi) . (3.13)
To demonstrate that the optimal admissible liquidation strategy is given by
s∗i = s
∗
j for all i, j, it first needs to be noted that a strategy with si > sj for
i < j is not an admissible strategy. Consider e.g. s1 > s2. Then the choice
LV1 = LV2+
s1−s2
2s1
(1−LV2) implies l1 > l2. (It can be checked that this expression
for LV1 is a valid choice in the sense that LV1 > LV2 and LV1 < 1.) Therefore
s1 > s2 violates the requirement (3.12). Note that the same reasoning can be
applied to any i, j with i < j, and that it is sufficient to have one choice of LV’s
that violates (3.12), since definition (3.12) should hold for any set LV’s.
It can be concluded that the set of admissible liquidation strategies may be
characterized by: s1 ≤ s2 ≤ s3 ≤ ... ≤ sN , where N denotes the last asset. Within
this set the optimal choice is s1 = s2 = s3 = ... = sN , since it will lead to the
lowest loss for the bank in an LSE. The conclusion is that the optimal admissible
strategy is specified by s1 = s2 = s3 = ... = sN = FL.
The final step in the completion of the valuation framework is the determi-
nation what fraction of an asset f in (3.7) a bank will liquidate in an LSE. The
optimal admissible liquidation strategy has been defined to determine this frac-
tion. It is the natural choice for valuation of possible liquidation strategies, since it
preserves the relation between liquidation values and liquidity spreads (3.12) and
within this admissible set minimizes the loss of the liquidation of assets.
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3.4 Summary of the model
Putting the above liquidity risk model, valuation approach and optimal admissible
liquidation strategy together the result is the following.
A cashflow at time T of an asset Ai without default risk should be discounted
with the discount factor
DF = e−(r+li)T , (3.14)
where the liquidity spread is given by
li = p(1− LVi)FL. (3.15)
Note that the discountfactor of the cashflow depends on the liquidity of the asset
that generates the cashflow through LVi. The other two factors, the probability of
an LSE p and the severity of an LSE FL, are not asset specific, but are determined
by the balance sheet of the bank.
3.5 Some consequences of the model
A consequence of (3.15) is that liquidity spreads of different assets (on the same
balance sheet) are related. Since in (3.15) the probability of an LSE and the
fraction of assets that need to be liquidated are the same for all assets, it follows
immediately that
li
lj
=
1− LVi
1− LVj . (3.16)
The liquidity spread of asset i and asset j are related through their liquidation
values.
A nice feature of the model is that it allows to explain a different discount
rate for a bond and a loan. Consider, for example, a zero-coupon bond and a
loan with the same issuer/obligor, same maturity, notional, and seniority. The
zero-coupon bond and loan therefore have exactly the same pay-off (even in case
of default). Nevertheless if the zero-coupon bond is liquidly traded, a difference
in valuation is expected. The model developed here, can provide an explanation
for this difference. The above relation (3.16) shows that the liquidity spreads
are related through the liquidation values of the zero-coupon and the loan. For
example, if the probability of an LSE for a bank is estimated at 5% per year,
and the severity of the event is that 20% of the assets need to be sold, and the
liquidation value for the ZC-bond is estimated at 80% and for the loan at 0% (since
the loan cannot be sold or securitized quickly enough) then the liquidity spreads
for the bond and loan are:
lbond = 20bp, (3.17)
lloan = 100bp. (3.18)
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These spreads are based on above example, and may differ significantly between
banks. Nevertheless, they clarify that it is natural in this framework that a different
discount rate is used for loans and bonds.
In this framework also the position size will affect the discount rate. Empirical
studies find a linear relation between the size of the sale and the price impact
[6, 7]. In the context of this paper this translates into a linear relation between
the position size and the liquidation value:
LVi = cxi (3.19)
where xi is the size of position in asset i, e.g. the number of bonds, and c a constant.
Consider a different position xj in the same asset. From (3.16) it immediately
follows that
li
lj
=
xi
xj
. (3.20)
Given a linear relation between the size of a sale and the price impact, the frame-
work derived here implies a linear relation between liquidity spread and position
size.
3.6 Replication and Parameter Estimation
One of the important concepts in finance is the valuation of derivatives through
determining the price of a (dynamic) replication strategy. Unfortunately, liquidity
risk is a risk that cannot be replicated or hedged. In principle it is conceivable
that products will be developed that guarantee a certain price for a large sale;
e.g. for a certain period the buyer of the guarantee can sell N shares for a value
N × S, where S denotes the value of a single share. Such products would help in
determining market implied liquidation values, but it is difficult to imagine that
such products will be developed that apply to large parts of the balance sheet.
In any case, currently liquidity risk cannot be hedged. Nevertheless the risk
should be valued. Therefore it seems appropriate to use the physical probability
of an LSE and liquidation value to determine the liquidity spread in (3.15) as
opposed to an imaginary risk neutral probability and liquidation value. Clearly,
if it would be possible to hedge this risk then the risk neutral values implied by
market prices should be used.
The physical probability of LSEs and the severity of the events are required to
estimate the liquidity spread, see (3.15). These may be difficult to estimate. On
the other hand, they only need to be estimated for the own institution (it would
seem much easier than PD estimates for obligors of banks). Certainly after the
credit crisis it is clear that the probability of an LSE for a bank is non-negligible.
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4 Extensions of the model
4.1 Including Credit Risk
This section adds credit risk to the framework. Recall (3.6) with (3.7). The
inclusion of default risk is straightforward under the assumption that default events
are independent from LSEs. The result is
V (t) = e−rdtV (t+ dt)[1− ldt− pd× LGDdt] , (4.1)
where pd is the instantaneous probability of default and LGD the Loss Given
Default. By introducing a credit spread
scredit = pd× LGD (4.2)
and solving (4.1) in a similar way as (3.6) gives the following value of a cashflow
of nominal 1
V = e−(r+l+scredit)T . (4.3)
The discount rate consists of a risk-free rate, a liquidity spread and a credit spread.
4.2 Liquidity Risk for Derivatives
Liquidity risk also affects the value of derivatives. In a Black-Scholes framework
liquidity risk results in an extra term in the PDE [9]
∂tV + rS∂SV +
1
2
σ2S2∂2SV = rV + lV max(V, 0). (4.4)
Here V denotes the value of the derivatives’ position, S the underlying stock, σ the
volatility, and lV the liquidity spread of the derivatives’ position. The last term on
the r.h.s. is the extra term coming from liquidity risk and is in fact equivalent to
the last term on the r.h.s. of (3.8). The max-function reflects that the value of the
derivative can be both positive and negative (depending on the type of derivative)
and that only positions with a positive value will be potentially liquidated in an
LSE. Note that it is assumed that the underlying is perfectly liquid (in the sense
that its liquidation value LV = 1), otherwise an additional term would occur to
include the illiquidity of the underlying.
In [9] also extensions of (4.4) are discussed that include credit risk.
A remarkable feature of (4.4) is that it is similar to models that some authors
have proposed for inclusion of funding costs in the valuation of derivatives. In
particular the extra term lV max(V, 0) has the exact same form as the term for
inclusion of funding costs derived by e.g. [10], with funding spread replaced by
liquidity spread. The model above is more complex than the model including
funding costs since the liquidity spread may be dependent on, for example, position
size.
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5 A paradox and an example
5.1 A paradox
As discussed in section 3 the liquidity spread is determined by the loss from a forced
sale of part of the assets in a liquidity stress event. The applied sell strategy is to
sell the same fraction of each asset. In practice however one would sell the most
liquid assets as this results in a smaller loss. Since a larger loss is accounted for
in the valuation, it seems that a risk-free profit can be obtained by holding an
appropriate amount of liquid assets or cash as a buffer for a liquidity stress event.
To analyze the paradox, consider a bank with a simple balance sheet, as shown
below
A = 80 L = 80
C = 20 E = 20
This bank has 80 illiquid assets, 20 cash, and its funding consists of 80 liabilities,
and 20 equity. It is exposed to an LSE where 20% of the funding is instantaneously
removed.
If the stress event occurs the resulting balance sheet used in the valuation is
A = 64 L = 60
C = 16 E = 20
The sale of the assets will result in a loss = (1− LVA)16. This loss is born by the
equity holders, who in this setup, provide the amount (1− LVA)16. This amount
combined with the result from the sale of the assets LVA16, and a cash amount
of 4 covers the withdrawal of funding. Note that this can be viewed as a two-step
approach whereby the funding withdrawal is covered by the cash and immediately
supplemented by the sale of the assets and the cash provided by the equity holders.
In practice a bank will use its cash buffer to compensate the loss of funding.
In contrast to the strategy of the pro rata sale of assets used for valuation, this
strategy will not lead to a loss. The resulting balance sheet is
A = 80 L = 60
C = 0 E = 20
The paradox is that the value of the assets includes the possibility of a loss
(through the liquidity spread), whereas in reality this loss seems to be avoided by
using the cash as a buffer.
However, the bank is now vulnerable to a next LSE, whereby 20% of its funding
is withdrawn. To be able to withstand such an event a cash buffer of 16 is required.
To avoid any liquidity risk this buffer should be realized immediately, which can
be achieved by the same sale of assets as in the strategy for valuation, resulting in
the same loss. Therefore, to avoid any liquidity risk the same loss is born by the
equity holders, which resolves the paradox.
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In practice the assets may be sold over a larger period of time, thereby the
bank chooses to accept some liquidity risk to avoid the full loss by an immediate
sale. The optimal strategy in practice is the result of risk reward considerations.
The paradox and its resolution suggests another argument that the liquidation
strategy where an equal fraction of each asset is liquidated is the appropriate
strategy to be used in valuation. Such a strategy keeps liquidity risk of the assets
of a bank’s balance sheet at the same level. After liquidation of an equal fraction
of the assets the average liquidity of the assets has not increased or decreased.
Therefore taking a constant level of liquidity risk as starting point would lead to
the same liquidation strategy, an equal fraction of all assets, for valuation.
5.2 Example for a stylized balance sheet
Consider the following stylized balance sheet of a bank.
retail loans 10 deposits 60
corporate loans 20 wholesale funding 30
mortgages 40 equity 10
central bank eligible bonds 10
corporate bonds> AA− 10
cash 10
The bank has considered its vulnerability to liquidity stress events, and it
concludes that in a stress event its deposits can reduce by 15 and its wholesale
funding also by an amount 15 within 3 months. The probability of such an event
is estimated at 5% per year. The translates into the parameters
p = 5% FL = 30% (5.1)
The bank decides to base the liquidation values of its assets on the Basel 3 Required
Stable Funding (RSF) factors. The basel document [1] states:“The RSF factors
assigned to various types of assets are parameters intended to approximate the
amount of a particular asset that could not be monetised through sale or use as
collateral in a secured borrowing on an extended basis during a liquidity event
lasting one year”. Although this does not exactly match the definition of the
liquidity stress event identified by the bank, since the bank’s stress event only
lasts 3 months, the bank chooses to identify
1− LV = RSF (5.2)
for each asset.
The result for the liquidity spread for the different assets is given in the table
below.
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Asset RSF liquidity spread (in bp)
retail loans 85% 127.5
corporate loans 65% 97.5
mortgages 65% 97.5
central bank eligible bonds 50% 75
corporate bonds> AA− 20% 30
cash 0% 0
The above liquidity spreads are the result of the assumptions of the bank in the
above example. For a specific bank the liquidity spreads depend on bank-specific
features, such as the fraction of stable, less-stable, and non-stable deposits, which
affect FL and p. Nevertheless the stylized bank above illustrates how different
assets get different liquidity spreads.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a liquidity risk valuation framework. It is shown that liquidity
risk of a bank affects the economic value of its assets. The starting observation
is that under an LSE the bank needs to liquidate some of its assets, which means
these will be sold at a discount. To develop the valuation framework a liquidation
strategy of the bank needs to be determined. It is shown that the optimal liqui-
dation strategy suitable for valuation is a strategy where of each asset the same
fraction is liquidated. The result is that cashflows are discounted including a liq-
uidity spread. This liquidity spread consists of three factors: the probability of an
LSE, the severity of an LSE, and the asset-specific discount in case of liquidation
in an LSE.
This result has a number of consequences
• The value of a position is not independent of the rest of the balance sheet,
since the balance sheet determines probability of an LSE and the severity
of an LSE. In particular the same position on two different balance sheets
may be valued differently.
• Two pay-offs that are exactly the same, but have a different liquidity may
be valued differently. For example, a bullet loan and a zero-coupon bond
of the same obligor/issuer with the exact same pay-off will have different
liquidity spreads if the zero-coupon bond is liquidly traded (and the bullet
loan is not).
• The size of a position affects the valuation. E.g. if a position in bonds
is large compared to the turnover in an LSE, the liquidation value of the
position may be lower than the liquidation value of a single bond. Therefore
a large position will have a higher liquidity spread than a small position.
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6.1 Future research
There are a number of areas that allow for future research.
• The observation that the PDE including liquidity risk (4.4) is the same PDE
that others have derived including funding costs [10] suggests a relation
between funding costs and liquidity risk. It is of interest to understand the
relation between funding costs and the liquidity, even if only in some limiting
cases (no taxes, assets fully diversified).
• Since the valuation of assets does not include funding costs, but does include
liquidity risk, this suggests that the FTP should be based on the liquidity
spread instead of funding costs. However, the impact on interest risk man-
agement would require careful investigation.
• The framework implies that the liquidity spread of two assets on the same
balance sheet is related through a simple relation involving only the liqui-
dation values of the assets (3.16). This suggests the same relation should
hold for traded prices of liquid and less liquid assets (at least if a sufficient
number of investors trades both assets). This allows for an empirical test of
the model.
• The securitization of illiquid assets, such as loans and mortgages, into more
liquid securities enhances the value of the assets. Within the liquidity risk
valuation framework developed here, it is possible to estimate this value.
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